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Vladimir Popov1 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
If there is a negative terms of trade or financial shock leading to the deterioration in the balance of 
payments, there are two basic options for a country that has limited foreign exchange reserves. First, a 
country can maintain a fixed exchange rate (or even a currency board) and wait until the reduction of 
foreign exchange reserves leads to the reduction of money supply: this will drive domestic prices down 
and stimulate exports, raise interest rates and stimulate the inflow of capital, and finally will correct the 
balance of payments. Second, the country can allow the devaluation of national currency – flexible 
exchange rate will automatically bring the balance of payments back into the equilibrium. Because 
national prices are less flexible than exchange rates, the first type of adjustment is associated with the 
greater reduction of output.   
The empirical evidence on East European countries and other transition economies for 1998-99 period 
(outflow of capital after the 1997 Asian and 1998 Russian currency crises and slowdown of output 
growth rates) suggests that the second type of policy response (devaluation) was associated with smaller 
loss of output than the first type (monetary contraction). 2008-09 developments provide additional 
evidence for this hypothesis. 
 
 
 
 
1 UN/DESA (New York), New Economic School (Moscow), Carleton University (Ottawa). The views presented in this 
paper represent the authors’ personal analysis and interpretation and should not be associated with the institutions with 
which he is associated. 
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 The problem 
In late 2008 Latvia, a small Baltic state (former Soviet republic) with less than 2.5 million people, a 
member of the EU since 2004, like many other developing and transition economies, faced the outflow 
of capital. Unlike many other countries, however, Latvia had a de facto (although not formal) currency 
board arrangement (its currency was pegged to the SDR since 1994 and to euro since 2004) and a huge 
current account deficit – over 20% of GDP in 2006-07 – financed by the inflow of capital. The 
slowdown of the capital inflows in 2008 led to the reduction of foreign exchange reserves from $6.6 
billion in May to $3.4 billion in November; money supply contracted by over 10% in 2008, GDP 
growth rates fell from 11-12% in 2006-07 to -10% in the fourth quarter 2008, unemployment grew.  
On Dec. 15, 2008 Paul Krugman, the recent Nobel Prize laureate, in an Op-Ed in New York Times 
compared Latvia to Argentina and later made a strong argument for the devaluation2.  “This looks like 
events repeating themselves, – he wrote, – the first time as tragedy, the second time as another 
tragedy”3. It was G.F.W. Hegel who argued that history repeats itself twice, whereas Karl Marx added: 
“the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.”4 
Why Latvia is compared to Argentina? Because Argentina also had a currency board that operated 
seemingly successfully (allowing to bring down hyperinflation) for a decade – from 1991 to 2002, but 
then collapsed: in 2002 Argentinean peso, previously pegged to a $US at a ratio of 1:1, devalued to 3:1 
in a matter of months. Currency board in Argentina proved to be good for fighting inflation (fig. 1), 
but not so good for economic growth (fig. 2). When in the late 1990s Argentina experienced the 
outflow of capital, the government and the central bank were sticking to the currency board 
arrangement, hoping that the automatic mechanism would finally work: foreign exchange reserves 
would decrease, money supply would shrink, leading to lower domestic prices and higher interest rates 
that would finally improve the deteriorating balance of payments.  The mechanism was working, but 
 
2 Sometimes distinction is being made between devaluation  (the decision of the central bank to go from one hard peg to 
another, a lower one) and depreciation (fall in the exchange rate under floating regime). In this paper these terms are used 
interchangeably to denote the decline of the exchange rate, whatever the reasons of this decline.  
     
3 Krugman, P. “Latvia is the new Argentina (slightly wonkish)”. NYT, December 23, 2008, 5:33 pm  
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/23/latvia-is-the-new-argentina-slightly-wonkish/ 
 
4 “Hegel remarks somewhere that all great world-historic facts and personages appear, so to speak, twice. He forgot to add: 
the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.” Marx, K. 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonapatre, Chapter 1. 
too slowly and with too high costs – the reduction of money supply was bringing down not only 
inflation, but also output, which contracted by 5% in 1999, 1% in 2000, and another 5% in 2001 
(fig.2). At this point, it was either the government or the peso that were supposed to fall, and finally 
both fell in 2002.  
Figure 1 
 
Source: World Development Indicators.  
 
Latvian developments resembled very much what happened in Argentina in 1999-2002 and it appears 
that everyone who is anyone has a strong opinion on the issue. Simon Johnson, former IMF chief 
economist, argued that Latvia too small to fail5, whereas Anders Aslund also believed that small open 
economies with sound economic policies should be bailed out6.  Latvian real effective exchange rate 
increased nearly twofold since 1994 and to regain competitiveness without devaluation Latvia should 
have experienced a severe deflation – major cuts in prices and wages. The problem is that prices and 
wages are not that flexible even in “small open economies with good policies”, so the price of 
deflation is a deep recession – a major reduction of output. Is the game worth a candle?  
 
                                                            
5 Johnson, S. Too Small to Fail. – Europe EconoMonitor, Dec. 26, 2008 (http://www.rgemonitor.com/euro-
monitor/254870/too_small_to_fail).  
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6 Aslund, A. Why Latvia Should Not Devalue. – Dec. 9, 2008 (http://www.petersoninstitute.org/realtime/?p=311).   
Figure 2 
 
Source:  World Development Indicators.  
 
 
In December 2008 the IMF agreed to issue Latvia a $2.35 billion credit – unprecedented amount equal 
to 1200% of the Latvian quota in the Fund and to 9% of the country’s GDP (the whole package 
included credits from the EU and from Nordic countries and totalled $10 billion, a good 40% of GDP). 
In February 2009, Latvian government resigned, but new government maintained the fixed exchange 
rate. Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Bosnia that maintain currency boards experienced similar 
difficulties. Three Baltic states, however, experienced the greatest reduction of output in Eastern 
Europe and in the world: their GDP in 2009 was 12 to 22% lower than in 2007 (EBRD, 2010).  
 
On the contrary, countries that devalued their currencies significantly (Poland, Hungary, Romania, 
Czech Republic) experienced less pronounced decline in output. China did not devalue, but stopped 
gradual revaluation of yuan (that has started in 2005) in summer 2008 and resumed it only well after 
the recession was over, in mid 2010.  
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Overall, there seems to be a negative relationship between the slowdown in growth in 2008-09 (2007 
GDP growth rates minus average 2008-09 growth) and the magnitude of devaluation (from the average 
2008 level to the lowest 2009 level) – fig. 3.  
 
Figure 3 
Growth slowdown in 2008-09 as compared to 2007 and devaluation of national 
currencies in 2009 aginst the USD
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Source:  World development Indicators; International Financial Statisttics.  
 
     The literature review and the hypotheses 
The debate on Latvia is part of at least century old debate on the advantages and costs of floating and 
fixed exchange rates and currency boards. The macro textbook theory is based on the Mundell-
Fleming model. One of its conclusions is that independent monetary policy is impossible under perfect 
capital mobility and fixed exchange rate because changes in domestic interest rate take the balance of 
payment out of the equilibrium with the resulting change in foreign exchange reserves (fig. 4): 
monetary expansion (LM curve shifts to the right), for instance, results in lower interest rates and 
outflow of capital, which in turn leads to the lower level of foreign exchange reserves and contraction 
of the money supply (LM curve shifts back to the left). On the contrary, with the flexible exchange rate 
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the monetary policy is 100% efficient – when monetary expansion leads to the decline in interest rates 
interest rate and outflow of capital, exchange rate of the national currency falls and this leads to the 
increase in income (IS curve moves right), so the new equilibrium is established at a point of higher 
income and the same level (world level) of interest rates.   
 
 
Figure 4. Central bank balance sheet, balance of payments and impossible trinity 
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Under the fixed exchange rate the adjustment to the external shock (say, to a fall in prices for exported 
goods or to an outflow of capital) occurs through changes in the money supply: 
• Trade balance (or capital account balance) deteriorates => FOREX fall => M falls => Domestic 
prices fall => Real exchange rate [RER = Domestic prices/Foreign prices)*Nominal exchange 
rate] falls => Trade balance improves (export increases, import shrinks). 
• Besides, tight monetary policy (M falls) leads to higher real interest rates, so there is an inflow 
of capital and an improvement of the capital account that also contributes to the restoration of 
balance of payment equilibrium.   
The problem with this type of adjustment is that monetary contraction, if prices are sticky, affects not 
only prices, but also output:  the reduction of money supply leads to a slow down of inflation only with 
a lag and during this lag output (or growth rates of output) falls, so the cost of bringing the RER back 
to the competitive level is a recession, like it happened in Russia in 1997-98 (fig. 5) and Argentina in 
1999-2002(fig. 3-4).  
Under fully flexible exchange rates the adjustment to the external shock (say, to a fall in prices for 
exported goods or to an outflow of capital) occurs without changes in FOREX and money supply, but 
through the exchange rate itself: 
• Trade balance (or capital account balance) deteriorates=> Nominal exchange rate falls 
(depreciates) => =>Real exchange rate [RER = Domestic prices/Foreign prices)*Nominal 
exchange rate] falls =>Trade balance improves (export increases, import shrinks). 
• Besides, domestic assets after devaluation become cheaper, so there could be a capital inflow 
(slowdown in capital outflow).  
 
 
 
Figure 5 
 
 
Source: Russian Economic Trends. 
 
 
This type of adjustment is also painful in a sense that it leads to the decline in consumption (net 
imports declines after devaluation), but domestic prices do not fall (actually, after some time they start 
to increase, eating up the pro-competitive effect of devaluation), so there is no depressive effect on 
output. The goal of this paper is to examine which type of adjustment is associated with greater 
reduction (slowdown of growth) of output – through money supply and slowdown of inflation or 
through devaluation. I look at the experience of former communist countries, especially countries of 
Eastern Europe (which had very different exchange rate regimes), that were affected by the outflow of 
capital in 1997-99, after the Asian (1997) and Russian (1998) currency crises. To the best of my 
knowledge, there are no papers examining this particular issue, but of course there is a large literature 
on the advantages and disadvantages of different exchange rate regime.  
 
Elimination of the currency risk is believed to be the most important advantage of a fixed exchange 
rate regime (this is even truer for currency boards and dollarization – in the latter case currency 
exchange transaction costs are also eliminated). The effects of common currencies on the volume of 
international trade were analyzed in Rose (2000), Engel and Rose (2002), Frankel and Rose (2002) and 
Glick, Reuven and Rose (2002). This research based on the application of the gravity model produced 
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surprisingly high estimates – international trade in the currency unions is three times more intensive 
than among similar countries that do not have a common currency. Attempts to capture this effect in 
the euro area, however failed. Numerous papers (see Frankel, 2008 for a survey) came up with an 
estimate which is lower by at least an order of magnitude – 10-15% increase in international trade in 
the first few years after the creation of the monetary union. 
 
 Hanke (2003), a strong proponent of currency board, points out that according to Eichengreen 
(2001) the evidence on the relationship between monetary regimes and growth is inconclusive, 
and does not support the claim that dollarization – or any exchange rate regime, for that matter – 
is an important determinant of growth. However, Edwards and Magendzo (2003) distinguish 
between independent currency unions (like the euro zone today) and dollarized economies (that 
do not have a say in monetary policy formulation, like Panama or Ecuador). They find that 
dollarized economies and currency unions have lower inflation than countries with a domestic 
currency. But dollarized countries have lower growth and higher volatility than countries with a 
domestic currency. Currency unions, on the other hand, have higher growth and higher volatility 
than countries with a currency of their own.  
 
The strongest argument against fixed exchange rates is that they force to abandon the independent 
monetary policy, whereas one-size-fits-all monetary policy obviously does not work. The reduction of 
output during the Great Depression, as Eichengreen and Sachs (1985) and Eichengreen and Irwing 
(2009) show was greater in countries that stuck to the gold standard, whereas countries that devalued 
their currencies (China, Japan, Denmark, Sweden) were able to limit the depth of the recession and to 
avoid sliding into protectionism.   
 
Among the opponents of the currency boards are Roubini  (1998) and Krugman (2003). The latter 
notes that “a currency board fitted a conservative ideology: by eliminating any discretionary monetary 
policy, it moved us back toward a pre-Keynesian world. That's why Forbes and the WSJ editorial page 
sang Argentina's praises; and Wall Street economists swallowed the whole thing”. 
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This issue is also discussed in terms pluses and minuses of exchange rate based stabilization (pegging 
national currency to a stable currency and using the peg as the nominal anchor) versus the money 
based stabilization – the policy of setting targets for monetary aggregates (gradually lowering these 
targets) while keeping the nominal rate flexible. The advantage of former is that it usually is believed 
to be credible (although there are a lot of cases of spectacular failures – from Russia in 1998 to 
Argentina in 2002). Money based stabilization allows more flexibility for monetary policy (one size 
does not fit all argument). For instance, if prices are sticky, so that 10% inflation is needed to avoid the 
depressing effect on output, then a 10% annual devaluation (provided there is zero inflation elsewhere) 
can ensure the stability of RER. The disadvantage of this policy is that there is no automatic 
mechanism to bring down inflation – everything depends on how strictly the CB will observe the 
targets. 
 
With regards to the medium- short-term, there is another argument – asymmetric shocks. These latter 
occur, for instance, when prices of commodities increase. Consider the case of the country that is an oil 
exporter and another country, which is an oil importer. The increase in oil prices will create a positive 
trade shock for the exporter and a negative shock for the importer. If both countries have fixed nominal 
exchange rates, in the former country FOREX would increase, in the latter – decrease. This latter 
country (oil importer) at the end of the day would not be able to sterilize the decline in FOREX (if the 
trade shock is significant enough), so the money supply would decrease, prices would fall, and RER 
would fall as well. Even if prices are perfectly flexible, there would be a need to move resources – 
labor and capital – from oil sector to other sectors of the economy. And when oil prices will grow 
again, there would be a need to move resources in the opposite direction (from other sectors to oil). 
Because oil prices fluctuate a lot, it would be unreasonable to move resources back and forth every 
time there is a trade shock. With fixed exchange rate the room for maneuver to adjust to these 
temporary shocks is limited.  
 
With fixed exchange rates, or, even more so - with currency board arrangements, effectively forcing 
countries to abandon their independent monetary policy, they are doomed to adjust to the trade shocks 
and inflows and outflows of capital through real indicators: when the exchange rate is pegged and 
prices are not completely flexible, changes in the money supply (caused by the fluctuation of reserves) 
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may affect output rather than prices. And as the recent experience of East Asian and transition 
economies showed, this kind of real sector adjustment is quite costly. To put it in the simplest form, 
under fixed exchange rate regime, neither changes in foreign exchange reserves, nor domestic price 
changes in response to money supply fluctuations provide enough room for maneuver for handling 
terms of trade shocks and international capital flows. 
 
Most developing and transition economies, with the exception of the smallest ones, like Hong Kong, 
Singapore and perhaps Baltic states) are large enough to remain not completely exposed to the world 
market competition and hence to retain some inflexibility of domestic prices with respect to the world 
market prices. Nevertheless, they are not large enough to create an appropriate cushion in the form of 
foreign exchange reserves, bringing down the vulnerability resulting from the international capital 
flows to reasonable levels. In most emerging markets (with the possible exception of China) foreign 
exchange reserves are normally enough to withstand several weeks, if not days of the attack on the 
currency. More than that, because the major international banks, investment and hedge funds operate 
with the pools of money comparable with or even exceeding the value of reserves in most countries, 
the fluctuations of the exchange rate remain the only reliable and efficient safety valve providing 
protection from external shocks. 
 
The consensus today, if any, could be probably summarized as follows: whereas exchange rate based 
stabilization may work at the initial stages of transition for fighting inflation, there is growing evidence 
that at later stages it becomes an obstacle for economic growth and creates the potential of the currency 
crisis by allowing the real exchange rate to appreciate. 
 
  The story: 1997-99 currency crises in EE and FSU countries  
In EE and FSU countries we find a variety of exchange rate regimes (table 1) and different patterns of 
adjustment to external shocks in 1998-99 (and in 2008-09). Slovenia (from 2007) and Slovakia (from 
2009) entered the Eurozone; Lithuania (since 1994), Estonia (since 1992), Bosnia and Herzegovina7 
                                                            
7  “At its inception, the convertible marka was pegged to the Deutsch mark at parity. The peg was converted to the 
euro, when the latter came into being, keeping the original exchange rate which amounts to approximately 2 KM per 
1 euro” (Kamhi and Dehejia, 2005, p. 4). 
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and Bulgaria (since 1997) maintained formal currency board arrangements, and Latvia had a de facto 
currency board since 1994; Kosovo and Montenegro used German mark and then euro without any 
formal arrangements allowing them to influence the policy of the ECB in Frankfurt.  All other 
countries maintained managed floats, although most of them initially had experimented with the fixed 
exchange rate. Three Baltic States became members of ERM – exchange rate mechanism that allows 
fluctuations of their domestic currencies to euro within the +15 – -15% corridor – but only in 2004-05. 
In order to join the Euro zone candidate countries must stay in ERM and demonstrate that they comply 
with the Maastricht criteria established for the budget deficit, government debt to GDP ratio, inflation 
and interest rates (fig. 6).  
 
In 1999 growth rate fell as a result of capital outflow after Asian (1997) and Russian (1998) currency 
crises (fig. 7) and there was obviously a slowdown in the growth of money supply (fig. 8) and nominal 
and real devaluations of national currencies (fig. 9). 
 
Most countries experienced a devaluation of nominal exchange rates in 1997-2000. In 1998-99 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia devalued most, whereas Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, and three Baltic states tried to support the value of their currencies (fig. 10).  Finally Czech 
Republic in 1997 and Poland in 1998 abandoned fixed exchange rates and moved to managed float.  
 
It is also clear from comparing figs. 11 and 12 that the rates of decline in M2 growth rates was much 
more pronounced in countries that tried to maintain fixed exchange rate than in countries that accepted 
devaluation of their currencies.  
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Table. 1. Exchange rate regimes as of February 2009 
Countries and  
territories 
Exchange rate regime Period Currency  Comments 
Slovenia  Euro zone Since 2007 Euro  
Slovakia  Euro zone Since 2009 Euro  
Kosovo  Using euro (before –  
German mark 1999) 
Since 2002
 
Euro  
Montenegro Using euro (before –  
German mark, since 1998)
Since 2002 Euro   
Estonia  Currency board  
(pegged to German mark, 
then – to euro) 
From 1992 Estonian 
kroon 
Member of ERM 
 since 2004, joined 
Eurozone in 2011 
Lithuania Currency board  
(pegged to the US$,  
then to euro) 
From 1994 Lithuanian 
litas 
Member of ERM 
 since 2004 
Bulgaria Currency board (pegged 
to German mark, then –
euro) 
From 1997 Bulgarian  
lev 
 
Bosnia Currency board (pegged 
to German mark, then 
 – to euro) 
From 1997 Convertible 
marka 
 
Latvia Fixed rate (since  
1994 – to SDR, since 
 2005 – to euro) 
From 1993 Latvian lats De facto currency  
board, member of 
 ERM since 2005 
Albania Managed float From 1992 Albanian lek  
Macedonia Managed float From 1994 Macedonian 
denar 
 
Croatia Managed float From 1993 Croatian  
kuna 
Preceded by  
Croatian dinar 
Serbia Managed float From 2000 Serbian  
dinar   
Preceded  Yugoslav 
dinar 
Romania Managed float From 1992 Romanian  
leu 
 
Hungary Managed float From 2001
(crawling 
 peg in  
1995-2001)
Hungarian 
forint 
 
Poland  Managed float From 1998 Polish zloty  
Czech Republic Managed float From 1997 Czech  
koruna 
 
Source: Wikipedia; Websites of ECB and national central banks.  
 
Fig. 6 
Maastricht criteria:
• ERM
– Prior to adopting the euro, a member state has to have its 
currency in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM 
II) for two years. 
– Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are the current 
participants in the exchange rate mechanism.
– Exchange rate (+15% – ‐15%)
• Budget deficit: <3%
• Government debt to GDP: <60%
• Interest rates: The nominal long‐term interest rate must not be more 
than two percentage points higher than in the three lowest inflation 
member states. 
• Inflation: No more than 1.5 percentage points higher than the three 
lowest inflation member states of the EU
 
Fig. 7 
 
Source: World Development Indicators.  
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Fig. 8 
 
Source: World Development Indicators.  
Fig. 9 
 
Source: World Development Indicators.  
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Fig. 10. Nominal exchange rate of East European currencies, 1997=100% (increase = 
devaluation) 
 
Source: International Financial Statistics.  
Fig. 11 
 
Source: World Development Indicators.  
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Fig. 12 
 
Source: World Development Indicators.  
 
 
Analysis – output fall and devaluation  
Testing econometrically whether the slowdown in growth was more pronounced in countries that 
experienced greater reduction of money supply and smaller devaluation seems to be a straightforward 
exercise. There is a complication though: if money supply growth and inflation are brought down from 
several hundred (or even thousands) percent a year to 20-40%, this has a positive effect on growth 
rates. But if money supply and inflation growth rates are reduced further, the effect on growth rates is 
negative.  
 
It was shown, that 20-40% a year inflation is sort of a threshold: there is no evidence that inflation of 
20 to 40% annually is ruinous for growth, while there is even some evidence that inflation below 20% 
a year may be even beneficial (Bruno and Easterly, 1995; Bruno, 1995; Stiglitz, 1998). Other studies 
found different thresholds (Polterovich, 2006), but the principle holds.  It may be even argued that the 
17 
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threshold for transition economies is actually higher than for other emerging markets because of the 
numerous structural rigidities. In most successfully performing transition economies inflation was by 
no means insignificant: it never fell below 20% a year in the first 5 years of transition in Poland and 
Uzbekistan, while in China, though it was low most of the time, there were outbursts of inflation in 
1988-89 and in 1993-95, when it increased to about 20%. 
 
Theoretically, the relationship between inflation and growth (Phillips curve) is different during high 
and low inflation. When inflation is low, the increase in money supply causes increase in output and 
increase in prices (because the AS curve is positively sloped). Normally, in the first 18 months there is 
an increase in output and prices, afterwards – only the increase in prices, output returns to the 
equilibrium level, because LRAS curve is vertical (all the steam goes into the whistle). This is demand 
pull inflation – caused by movements of AD curve.  
 
If inflation rises to above 20-40% a year, the relationship between growth and inflation is different. 
High inflation and hyperinflation leads to the reduction of the demand for real cash balances, so there 
is a demonetization, destruction of financial markets and uncertainty for investors. Hence supply curve 
moves to the left and upwards and the economy experiences the adverse supply shock – output growth 
rates fall. This is a negative relationship between growth and inflation; it is caused by the structural 
demonetization factors that lead to the adverse shift in AS curve.  
 
As fig. 13 suggests, Russia obviously had a negative relationship between growth and inflation in the 
1990s, when inflation was mostly over 40% a year: every time inflation was brought down (in 1995-97 
and from 1999 onwards), growth accelerated.  
 
The same result holds for cross-country comparisons: countries with low inflation exhibited higher 
growth rates than those with high inflation over the period 1975-95 (countries with inflation above 
40% a year actually had negative growth rates). 
 
But if inflation rates are moderate, then attempts to reduce inflation may negatively affect the economy 
So, there is a positive relationship between growth and inflation in the short-term for relatively low 
inflation (below 20-40% a year), as is the case in China, for example (fig. 14).  
 
Fig. 13 
 GDP growth rates and inflat ion (right  axis, log scale) in Russia, %, 1990-2005
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Source: Goskomstat. 
 
Fig. 14 
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GDP growth rates (lagged one year)  and inflation (GDP deflator) in China, % a 
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Source: World Development Indicators.  
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To summarize, the link between inflation and growth is different under high and low inflation. If 
inflation rises to over 20-40% a year, there is a demonetization of the economy due to the reduction of 
demand for money; this leads to the unfavorable supply shock – movement of the AS curve to the left 
and upwards. If inflation is relatively low (less than 20% a year) the AS curve stays put and 
relationship between inflation and growth is determined by the movements of AD curve, i.e. there is a 
regular Phillips curve relationship in the short run (positive), and no relationship in the long run.  
 
High inflation of the early 1990s in former Soviet republics and in many EE countries had an adverse 
impact on output. Bringing this inflation down from hundreds (and even thousands) percent a year to 
20% had a positive impact on growth, but too much of the monetary tightening, like in Russia in 1998 
(year on year inflation in July 1998 was 6% only), caused a wave of non-payments and led to a new 
reduction of output.  
 
Such a non-linear relationship between inflation and growth creates a complication for the econometric 
analysis of the effects of devaluation on performance during the period of outflow of capital from 
transition economies in 1997-98. We have to consider several effects: devaluation has a stimulative 
effect on output; reduction of money supply growth rates has a repressive effect on output; very high 
inflation and increases of inflation, when it is high already have repressive effect on output as well. For 
countries with relatively low inflation in 1995-97 the slowdown of growth of M2 (monetary 
contraction) was associated with greater decline in output; but for countries with high inflation and 
expansionary monetary policy monetary contraction was associated with smaller slowdown in growth 
(fig. 15).  
 
Regressions are reported in table 2.  
 
Third equation from the table 2: Output loss is always proportionate to M2 slowdown, but the higher is 
devaluation as compared to M2 growth rates, the smaller is output loss (control variables in red): 
 
 
Fig. 15. Slowdown in monetary expansion and in output growth in 1998-99 as compared to 1995-
97 
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Slowdown in output growth in 1998-99 =  
=0.56 + M2loss*(0.0015M2growth95-97–9.1*10-6 *DEV) – 0.00035*Infl95-97*INFLslowdown= 
=0.56 + 0.0015M2loss*(M2growth95-97–0.0061DEV) – 0.00035*Infl95- 97*INFLslowdown,  
Where: 
• M2 slowdown in 1998-99 as compared to 1995-97, p.p., 
• Devaluation in 1997-99, %, 
• M2 growth rates in 1995-97, annual average, %, 
• Annual average inflation in 1995-97, %, 
21 
 
22 
 
• Inflation slowdown in 1998-99 as compared to 1995-97, p.p. 
 
 
Table 2. Relationship between output loss in 1998-99, devaluation and slowdown of M2 growth – 
regression results, robust estimates (T-statistics in brackets, ***- 1% significance, ** - 5% 
significance, * - 10% significance) 
Dependent variable – Difference between annual average growth rates of GDP per capita in 
1995-97 and 1998-99, p.p.  
Equation/ 
Variable 
1, N=26 2, N=26 3, N=26 
M2 slowdown in 1998-99 as compared to 1995-97, p.p.  0.038**  
(2.28) 
 
(Devaluation in 1997-99, %)*(M2 slowdown, p.p.)   -9.1*10-6 ***
(-4.39) 
(M2 growth rates in 1995-97)* (M2 slowdown, p.p.)   0.0015***  
(4.97) 
Annual average inflation in 1995-97, % -0.04*** 
 (-5.64) 
  
(Inflation in 1995-97, %)* (Inflation slowdown in  
1998-99 as compared to 1995-97, p.p.) 
 -.00008*** 
(-5.92) 
-0.00035*** 
5.70) 
Constant 3.47*  
(1.78) 
-0.09 
(-0.10) 
0.56  
(0.66) 
Adjusted  R2, % 36 55 68 
 
 
Other things being equal, the slowdown in growth rates in 1998-99 was lower, if preceding inflation 
was high and the reduction of this inflation rate was also high (these two indicators are correlated, of 
course – countries that substantially reduced inflation were exactly the ones that had high inflation 
before). Controlling for this impact of high inflation and transition to low inflation, the relationship 
between the slowdown in output on the one hand and slowdown of monetary expansion and 
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devaluation looks pretty straightforward. Expression in brackets – the difference between money 
supply growth and devaluation – characterizes de facto real exchange rate: if money supply grows fast, 
prices grow fast as well, and nominal devaluation may not be enough to ensure real devaluation, so 
there is a real appreciation and the higher it is, the greater the suppressing effect of monetary 
contraction on output.  
 
Expression in brackets is always positive, there is no threshold, but this type of non-linear relationship 
fits the data better. This expression in brackets is the elasticity of output slowdown on M2 slowdown, 
i.e. the magnitude of the impact of monetary contraction depends on the difference between money 
growth and devaluation.  If devaluation in 1997-99 was small, whereas growth rates of money supply 
in 1995-97 were high, then the decrease in the growth rates of money supply in 1998-99 as compared 
to 1995-97 led to a very substantial decrease in output in 1998-99.  To put it differently, monetary 
contraction was extremely detrimental to performance, if carried out without devaluation.  
 
Outflow of capital in 2008-09 
Capital flows8 to developed and developing countries changed dramatically during recent economic 
recession. In particular, emerging and developing economies experienced a decline in international 
financing  – from an inflow of  $250 bill. in the second quarter of 2008, before the crisis, to an outflow 
of 200 billion in the fourth quarter of 2009. In the second and third quarters of 2009 capital inflows to 
developing countries returned to pre-crisis level, although later they declined to about $50 billion in 
the first quarter 2010 (see chart). Advanced economies did not experience a decline in capital inflows 
in the beginning of the crisis, and there was an increase in inflows in the second and third quarters of 
2009 with subsequent decline of inflows in late 2009 – early 2010 (fig. 16).  
It is usually believed that the reduction of the capital inflows contributes to the decline in output 
(recession), but this was not actually the case in 2008-09. The performance of developing countries 
that were most affected by the reduction of the capital inflows was actually better than the performance 
of developed countries. There was no correlation between shocks to the capital account (change in the 
                                                            
8 Capital inflows are defined as the sum of financial account, capital account and errors and omissions in the balance of 
payments data in International Financial Statistics (IMF). They are equal to the difference between the increase in foreign 
exchange reserves, including gold, and current account balance. Because balance of payments statistics is published with a 
delay, we proxy capital inflows with the difference between increase in reserves and the trade balance. For most countries, 
as past data show, this is a very reasonable approximation.  
inflow of capital) and economic performance as measured by the change in GDP in 2007-09 or in 2009 
alone. China and India experienced the decline in capital inflows from Q2 2008 to Q3-4 2008 and Q1 
2009 of the same magnitude (several percentage points of GDP) as Baltic states and Ukraine, but in the  
former countries 2009 GDP was 14 to 18% higher than in 2007, whereas in the latter – 10 to 22% 
lower (fig. 17).  
Fig. 16 
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Source: International Financial Statistics. 
 
To be sure, GDP growth rates depend not only external shocks, such as changes in capital inflows, but 
also on domestic economic developments. However, if domestic conditions are unchanged, there may 
be several factors that explain the lack of correlation between changes in capital flows and the depth of 
the recent recession. The crucial one is how countries handled the deterioration of the balance of 
payments – by running down foreign exchange reserves (with possible impact on the domestic money 
supply in the absence of sterilization) or by devaluation of national currencies. Ceteris paribus, 
devaluation of the national currency in response to the negative trade or capital account shocks, 
provides stimuli to the national economy by making the production of tradables more profitable. So 
capital outflow (as well as negative trade shock) should not necessarily cause a recession.  
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Fig. 17. Increase in net capital inflows in 2008-09 and change in GDP in 2007-09, % 
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Source:  World Development Indicators; International Financial Statistics. 
 
It is widely believed, for instance, that Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) experienced the 
greatest reduction of output in 2007-09 (from 12 to 22%) not because of trade and capital account 
shocks (that were not that large – 2 % of GDP), but mostly due to the policy to maintain the exchange 
rates of their currencies (Estonia and Lithuania run formal currency boards and Latvia has a de facto 
currency board). Outflow of capital of about 4% of GDP (partially counterweighted by the 
improvement of the trade balance of about 2% of GDP) led to the reduction of foreign exchange 
reserves, which under the regime of a currency board automatically translated into the decline of the 
money supply (fig. 18), very much like the outflow of capital from Argentina in 2000-2002 (that also 
had a currency board at a time) caused a recession. 
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Fig. 18 
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Source:  World Development Indicators. 
 
On the other hand, the expansionary effect of devaluation is limited, of course. If the negative trade 
and capital account shocks are too large, devaluation cannot mitigate these shocks completely, but only 
triggers inflation. Countries like Russia and Bulgaria experienced a combined trade and capital account 
shock of the magnitude of 7% of GDP (deterioration of the trade and capital account balance from Q2 
2008 to average of subsequent 3 quarters – Q3-4 2008 and Q1 2009). Even though these countries did 
not finance these shocks completely by running down the reserves (they fell only by about 3% of GDP 
per quarter), but also devalued their national currencies, they were not able to avoid the reduction of 
output that became one of the largest in the world.  
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The regression equation that best explains the decline in output in 2007-09 (or in 2009 alone) is as 
follows9 ( T-statistics in brackets):  
 
Yincr07_09 = 1.8 – 1.3CAPinflQ2 - 2.1TRbalINCRQ2  + 1.9FORincrQ3 
(2.38)         (-3.36)               (-4.55)                   (3.93) 
 
Number of obs. =      92, R-squared     =  0.1788, robust standard errors, 
 
where: 
Yincr07_09    – GDP change in 2007-09, 
CAPinflQ2   –   increase in capital inflow from Q2 2008 to average for Q3- 4 2008 and Q1 2009, % of 
2008 GDP, 
TRbalINCRQ2 –  increase in trade balance from Q2 2008 to average for Q3-4 2008 and Q1 2009, % 
of 2008 GDP, 
FORincrQ3– average quarterly increase in foreign exchange reserves in Q3-4 2008 and Q1 2009, % of 
2008 GDP10. 
 
It implies that the negative shocks to the capital account (as well as to the trade account) do not lead to 
the decline in GDP growth rates, if foreign exchange reserves do not decline proportionately, i.e. if the 
shock is absorbed by devaluation, not by running down the reserves.  
 
9 This and other equations work, if changes in GDP are measured by 2009 growth rate alone (not 2007-09), and also if 
changes in capital and trade shocks are measured as the difference between average values for Q2-3 29008 and Q4 2008 – 
Q1 2009, whereas changes in reserves are computed as average quarterly change for the period Q4 2008 – Q1 2009.   
10 Note that the sum of CAPinflQ2 and TRbalINCRQ2 is NOT equal to the increase in the foreign exchange reserves in 
any particular quarter. Changes in trade balance and capital flows are measured as second differences (increase from Q2 
2008 to the average quarterly level of Q3-4 2008 and Q1 2009), whereas increase in reserves over the same period is 
measured as the first difference (average increase from the beginning of the quarter to an end of the quarter) .  
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To summarize, fluctuations in capital flows had a serious impact on performance during the recent 
recession of 2007-09. The rule of thumb was that large outflows of capital, especially coupled with 
negative trade shocks, suppressed economic activity. But if the shocks were relatively small (up to 3% 
of GDP change in trade and capital account from Q2 2008 to an average of subsequent 3 quarters), it 
was possible to mitigate them through devaluation (not allowing foreign exchange reserves to drop by 
the same amount). If the shocks were large, even devaluation did not allow to avoid output fall.  
 
Conclusions 
Countries that responded to external financial shocks – outflow of capital – by devaluating their 
currencies experienced a smaller slowdown in growth than countries that did not devalue and allowed 
their money supply to contract. Because national prices are less flexible than exchange rates, the first 
type of adjustment (devaluation) was associated with the smaller reduction of output. Except for 
countries with very high inflation, it seems like external (trade and financial) shocks were less ruinous 
for the national economy, if they were not met with substantial devaluation.  
However, even though adjustment to external shocks is more costly under fixed exchange rates, it does 
not necessarily mean that flexible rates are better. It may well be that long-term gains (increase in 
international trade resulting from the elimination of currency risk) outweigh short-term pains 
(reduction of output in response to external shocks)  
There may also be political economy reasons for the fixed exchange rate – currency board 
arrangements. Currency boards (“outsourcing” of monetary policy) are usually supported by the 
conservatives (rightists). Besides, fixed exchange rate is good for international business, i.e. 
companies and individuals involved in international trade and capital movement.   
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